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A NEW OPTIONS THEORY FOR RISK
MULTIPLIERS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN
FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION
PETER H. HUANG*
Given the importance of private enforcement of federal civil rights laws, Congress
and the courts have attempted to encourage plaintiffs' attorneys to accept meritori-
ous civil rights cases through fee shifting and risk multipliers. Recently, however,
the Supreme Court has essentially prohibited the use of risk multipliers, thus un-
dercompensating attorneys for the risk of losing civil rights actions and discourag-
ing the filing of such cases. In this Article, Professor Huang develops a new
options-based theory of calculating attorney's fees. Professor Huang argues that a
lawsuit consists of a sequence of options to continue with the case rather than a
once-and-for-all irreversible commitmenl thus allowing an attorney to assess the
plaintiffs probability of prevailing at trial at different stages in a lawsuit. His pro-
posal is for courts to recognize this option feature of lawsuits and adjust tie risk
multiplier accordingly. Consequently, the size of the risk multiplier would more
accurately reflect the risk of losing, thus providing attorneys with better incentives
to bring meritorious civil rights actions. In developing his theory, Professor Huang
surveys the history and caselaw on risk multipliers, applies a simple options ap-
proach to lawsuits, and discusses the effect of an options-based approach on attor-
neys' incentives to bring and settle civil rights actions. A mathematical Appendir
formally models Professor Huang's options-based approach.
I truly believe that no matter what you've done in your life, no mat-
ter how bad you perceive it to be, you can alvays change where you
are-by looking to the future, and from that moment on being a
different person.
1
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B., 1976, Princeton Uni-
versity, Ph.D., 1984, Harvard University;, J.D., 1997, Stanford University. Many thanks to
Mitch Polinsky for suggesting writing about civil rights risk multipliers; Steve Burbank,
Colin Diver, Geoffrey Hazard, Jason Johnston, Mike Knoll, Paul Mahoney, Mitch
Polinsky, Eric Posner, Eric Rasmusen, Ed Rock, Matt Spitzer, and Bill Tyson for helpful
suggestions; Ken Arrow, Joe Grundfest, Chris Stone, and Eric Talley for illuminating con-
versations; Matt Spitzer for financial support during a John M. Olin Program in Law and
Economics fellowship at the USC Law Center, the Institute for Law and Economics at the
University of Pennsylvania for its financial support; and audiences at USC, Stanford Uni-
versity, University of Pennsylvania, George Mason University, George Washington Uni-
versity, Vanderbilt University, Boston University, and UCLA Law Schools, and "The Role
of Private Parties in the Enforcement Process" panel of the American Law and Economics
Association meetings, May 9, 1998, for comments.
1 Madonna, Video Timaeline (VI--1 television broadcast, Aug. 13, 199S).
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INTRODUCTION
Federal civil rights laws2 are not only publicly enforced by federal
agencies; they are also privately enforced by private practitioners.3
Indeed, "[c]ut-backs on federal funding of legal services, restrictions
on practice areas of legal services entities, and the financial difficulties
of nonprofit law centers have increased more than ever the role pri-
vate practitioners play in enforcement of civil rights legislation."14
Given the importance of private practitioners, a fundamental question
in civil rights practice is how to encourage attorneys to accept merito-
rious cases. To provide financial incentives for taking on civil rights
litigation, Congress and many state legislatures have enacted numer-
ous fee-shifting statutes which require that losing defendants pay for
"reasonable" plaintiffs' attorney's fees.5 However, as is often the case
2 In this article, the term "federal civil rights laws" includes both Reconstruction-era
and modem civil rights statutes. For examples of the latter, see, e.g., Voting Rights Act of
1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1994); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983 (1994); Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1994 & Supp. 1995); Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994).
3 Professors Stewart Schwab and Theodore Eisenberg have found that most civil rights
litigation is undertaken by solo practitioners and small private law firms. See Stewart J.
Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence
of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 719,
768 n.178 (1988) (citing J. Casper, Lawyers in Defense of Liberty: Lawyers Before the
Supreme Court in Civil Liberties and Civil Rights Cases, 1957-66, at 207 (1968) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University)). Professor Michael Selmi also presents empiri-
cal data on the importance of private representation in enforcing federal civil rights. See
Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency's Role in Employment
Discrimination Law, 57 Ohio St. LJ. 1, 22, 57 (1996).
4 Julie Davies, Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990s: The Dichotomy Between
Reality and Theory, 48 Hastings L.J. 197, 262-63 (1997) (arguing that Supreme Court deci-
sions since 1976 harmfully reduce incentives for private attorneys to accept civil rights
cases).
5 Several federal civil rights statutes contain fee-shifting provisions. See, e.g., Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994); Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1369(b)(3) (1994); Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988(b) (1994); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 20OOe-5(k) (1994);
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (1994); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. § 12205 (1994). In addition, different states have their own state civil rights laws;
California, for example, still allows courts discretion to award risk multipliers in areas like
employment discrimination. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1021.5 (West 1980 & Supp. 1996).
Other federal statutes promoting the public interest also authorize fee-shifting. See
Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(2)(B), (g)(3)(B) (1994 & Supp. 1996); Government
in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(i) (1994 & Supp. 1996); Equal Access to Justice Act,
28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(b), (d) (1994); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(t) (1994); Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9659(f) (1994). Each issue of the Attorney Fee Awards Reporter, which is published
bimonthly, includes an updated list of federal statutes authorizing the awarding of reason-
able attorney's fees.
The options theory of litigation presented in this Article not only applies to civil rights
actions, but also to public interest lawsuits generally. The Supreme Court has stated that
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with legislative history and statutory interpretation, courts have dis-
agreed over exactly what the word "reasonable" means. In turn, these
disagreements have generated a great deal of litigation over statutory
fee-shifting.6 This Article develops a new theory of compensation for
civil fights actions and suggests a way to understand and calculate
"reasonable" attorney's fees in light of this theory.
Two particular features characterize the private enforcement of
civil rights laws. First, plaintiffs may not be able to afford to pay their
counsel. Many potential plaintiffs are poor or underemployed,7 and
the costs of litigation can be extraordinarily high.8 One-way proplain-
tiff fee-shifting statutes have attempted to address this concern by re-
quiring that losing defendants pay reasonable plaintiffs' attorney's
fees.
Second, when plaintiffs' attorneys are only paid if plaintiffs pre-
vail, those attorneys, and not the plaintiffs, bear the risk9 of losing. To
give plaintiffs' attorneys sufficient incentives to offset the risk of non-
payment, courts in the past multiplied statutory attorney's fee awards
by a factor that reflected the risk of losing. Traditionally, the risk mul-
tiplier was the reciprocal of the initial (that is, as viewed from the start
of the lawsuit) probability of the plaintiff prevailing at trial.10 How-
ever, a series of Supreme Court decisions in the 1980s essentially pro-
its rulings on risk multipliers apply uniformly to all fee award statutes. See City of Burling-
ton v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992).
6 Indeed, the number of attorney's fee cases on the Supreme Court's docket has in-
creased significantly in the last decade. See Davies, supra note 4, at 209-10 & n.50 (citing
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Supreme Court on Attorney Fee Awards, 1985 and 1986 Terms:
Economics, Ethics, and Ex Ante Analysis, 1 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 621, 632-36 (19SS)).
7 See Davies, supra note 4, at 200 (arguing that damages for discrimination against
poor or underemployed are "too low to offer much compensation to an attorney in the
event of a settlement").
8 See id. at 246, 264 (citing expert fees, length of time in taking case to trial, defense
strategies involving delay, and amount of resources channeled into collateral litigation as
reasons for high cost of lawsuits).
9 The term "risk" comes from an early Italian word "risicare' meaning -to dare." For
a fascinating history of the role of risk in human society, see Peter L Bernstein, Against
the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk 8 (1996).
10 For more on such a traditional multiplier calculation, see Samuel R. Berger, Court
Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What Is "Reasonable"?, 126 U. Pa. L Rev. 281, 324-26 (1977)
(discussing reasonableness of court-awarded attorney's fees); Marshall J. Breger, Compen-
sation Formulas for Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 47 Law & Contemp. Probs. 249, 259
(1984) (analyzing alternative approaches to attorney compensation rates); William J. Lynk,
The Courts and the Plaintiff's Bar. Awarding the Attorney's Fee in Class-Action litiga-
tion, 23 J. Legal Stud. 185, 187 (1994) (discussing risk multiplier approach); see also Affida-
vit of Frank H. Easterbrook & Robert A. Sherwin at 2-3, In re Burlington Northern, Inc.,
Employment Practices Litigation, Nos. MDL 374, 78 C 269, 19S5 WL 1808 (N.D. Ill. May
31, 1985) (on file with the New York University Law Review) (discussing factors affecting
multiplier).
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hibited the use of risk multipliers out of a concern that they encourage
plaintiffs' attorneys to accept nonmeritorious civil rights lawsuits.1
This Article argues that it is difficult to determine whether a civil
rights lawsuit is or should be considered meritorious by only consider-
ing the initial probability of the plaintiff prevailing at trial. In fact,
many factors influence that initial probability, and that probability
changes in response to discovery as the lawsuit proceeds. Drawing on
this insight, and options theory generally,12 this Article develops a
new options theory of federal civil rights lawsuits. An options ap-
11 See infra Part I (discussing Supreme Court treatment of risk multipliers).
12 Financial (call) options provide their holders with the right, but not the obligation, to
buy a certain amount of an underlying financial instrument, such as a stock, bond, com-
modity (such as corn, soybeans, wheat, or gold) futures contract, foreign currency, or index
at a certain price on or before a certain date. The awarding of the 1997 Nobel Prize in
economics to two financial economists, Robert Merton and Myron Scholes, for their path-
breaking theoretical research about options is only the latest indication that options are an
increasingly relevant economic tool. See, e.g., Michael M. Phillips, TWo U.S. Economists
Win Nobel Prize: Merton and Scholes Share Award for Breakthrough in Pricing Stock
Options, Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1997, at A2. Not only are stock options now a $148 billion
industry, but also, "[i]f you have a mortgage, for example, you are an options trader: You
have the option to pay off that mortgage at any time." David R. Henderson, Message from
Stockholm: Markets Work, Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1997, at A22. For more about financial
options, see generally Richard A. Brealey & Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate
Finance 557-88 (5th ed. 1996) (providing overview of financial options for corporate man-
agers); George Crawford & Bidyut Sen, Derivatives for Decision Makers: Strategic Man-
agement Issues 16-21 (1996) (explaining how options work); Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard
S. Black, The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 231-50 (2d ed. 1995) (providing
options primer for corporate lawyers); Philippe Jorion, Big Bets Gone Bad: Derivatives
and Bankruptcy in Orange County 38-57 (1995) (explaining role of derivatives and struc-
tured notes in collapse of Orange County Investment Pool); Robert W. Kolb, Financial
Derivatives 73-122 (1996) (describing options markets); Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail
Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation, 55 Md. L. Rev. 1, 40-46 (1996) (pro-
viding definition of options). Of course, the imminent collapse and recent bailout of Long-
Term Capital Management (with Merton and Scholes as principals) suggests that "the elite
of America's financial powerhouses-as well as a few dozen other global heavyweights,
either didn't know about or were comfortable with the risks they were taking in their deal-
ings in Long-Term Capital." How a Big Hedge Fund Marketed Its Expertise and
Shrouded Its Risks, Wall St. J., Sept. 25, 1998, at Al.
"Real options" refer to those that options managers have in capital investment
projects, such as the option to abandon, to make follow-on investments, to wait (and learn)
before investing, or to vary a firm's output or its production methods. See generally
Brealey & Myers, supra, at 589-616 (providing an overview of real options for corporate
managers); Avinash K. Dixit & Robert S. Pindyck, Investment Under Uncertainty 6-25
(1994) (describing options approach to investment); Lenos Trigeorgis, Real Options 1-4, 9-
20, 121-50 (1996) (providing an overview of conceptual framework for real options in capi-
tal budgeting). Commonplace options include leasing (or renting) with an option to buy a
car, a home, furniture, or appliances; the option to refinance a home loan at a lower inter-
est rate by prepaying a mortgage; the option to switch consumer credit card purchases to a
new card with special introductory low interest rates on balance transfers; and "pawn
shop" or no-recourse margin loans in which borrowers have the option to walk away from
their loans without repaying them, but in so doing forfeit the items pawned or their margin
amounts (and whatever items were purchased on margin). An example of an option which
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proach to litigation recognizes that a lawsuit consists of a sequence of
options to continue with the case instead of a once-and-for-all irre-
versible commitment. This theory demonstrates that both the tradi-
tional and the current Supreme Court approaches to risk multipliers
are incomplete. While the traditional multiplier overcompensates for
the risk of losing and thus may induce "excessive" litigation, the
Supreme Court's position undercompensates for the risk of losing and
thus does not provide adequate incentives for civil rights actions. An
options theory suggests that the size of the multiplier which exactly
compensates for the risk of losing is between one and the reciprocal of
the initial probability of the plaintiff prevailing. The policy implica-
tions of an options theory include the conclusion that Congress or the
Supreme Court should again allow risk multipliers to augment statu-
tory fee awards and that such multipliers should be set at less than the
initial reciprocal of the probability of the plaintiff prevailing in the
lawsuit.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I chronicles the history and
current status of the caselaw on risk multipliers. Part II presents a
brief options tutorial for readers unfamiliar with options in general
and the options approach to lawsuits in particular. It also applies the
options theory of litigation to civil rights lawsuits, particularly to the
option value of discovery in a lawsuit. Part m discusses the options
approach to civil fights risk multipliers and plaintiffs' attorneys' incen-
fives to settle lawsuits in the presence of risk multipliers. Part IV pro-
poses public policy reforms regarding risk multipliers. Part V
discusses other economic issues related to the determination of appro-
priate risk multipliers. These issues are related to proposed public
policy reforms because different goals imply different reforms. A
mathematical Appendix formally models the two key issues of inter-
est, namely: (1) the incentives for plaintiffs' attorneys to accept law-
suits when there are risk multipliers; and (2) the appropriate levels of
risk multipliers to compensate plaintiffs' attorneys for the risk of
nonpayment.
I
TH HISTORY OF RISK MULTIPLIERS IN THE ASSESSMENT
OF REASONABLE ArroRNEY's FEES
The traditional method used by federal courts to compute multi-
pliers to account for the risk of nonpayment was to apply a risk multi-
plier to the "lodestar method" of calculating attorney's fees. The
may be familiar to budding lawyers is the option to accept an offer for permanent employ-
ment as an associate in a law firm after working at that firm as a summer associate.
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lodestar method takes the product of an attorney's reasonable hourly
rate and a reasonable number of hours spent on the case as the start-
ing point for determining reasonable attorney's fees.13 This lodestar
was then enhanced by a risk multiplier if the lawsuit had a low initial
probability of success.
Both the use of the lodestar as the starting point for the judicial
determination of reasonable attorney's fees and the use of risk multi-
pliers originated in the early 1970s.14 For roughly a decade, awarding
risk multipliers was standard judicial practice in public interest cases.15
In Hensley v. Eckerhart,'6 for example, the Supreme Court held that
lodestar fees were the starting point for determining fee awards in
civil rights cases.' 7 The concurring opinion explicitly stated that the
lodestar was merely a starting point and that district courts should
then undertake an inquiry that included "the pre-litigation likelihood
that the claims which did in fact prevail would prevail."18
Nonetheless, in a subsequent decision, Blum v. Stenson,19 the
Supreme Court changed its approach and stated that upward adjust-
ments in attorney's fees are rarely appropriate under the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.20 The Court held that neither
the novelty and complexity of the legal issues involved,2' nor the spe-
cial skill and experience of legal representation,22 nor the results ob-
tained in litigation 23 justified a multiplier, reasoning that all of these
factors had already been taken into account in calculating the lodestar
figure itself. 24 Although the Supreme Court did not hold that such an
13 See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) ("The most useful starting
point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably
expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.").
14 See, e.g., Lindy Bros. Builders of Philadelphia v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 167-68 (3d Cir. 1976) (setting forth guidance for applying risk
multipliers to lodestar); Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 471 (2d Cir. 1974) (estab-
lishing standards for calculating risk multipliers); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974) (providing list of twelve factors to guide courts'
discretion to enhance lodestar figure).
15 For the early history of risk multipliers, see John Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor
in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 Yale L.J. 473, 475-78 (1981).
16 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
17 See id. at 433.
18 Id. at 449 (Brennan, J., concurring).
19 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
20 See id. at 897, 901.
21 See id. at 898.
22 See id. at 899-900.
23 See id. at 900.
24 See id. at 901.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 73:19431948
December 1998] OPTIONS THEORY FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
upward adjustment was never legitimate, Blum was the first in a series
of decisions which have all but rejected the use of a multiplier.2-
The trend against risk multipliers continued in Pennsylvania v.
Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air,26 in which the Court
declined to award a multiplier for superior performance. 7 The Court
stressed that the lodestar figure should be "more than a mere 'rough
guess' or initial approximation of the final award to be made"; instead,
the court stressed that the lodestar is presumably the reasonable fee.28
While in Delaware Valley the Court was sharply divided and was un-
able to reach consensus regarding the permissibility of risk multipli-
ers,29 the Court finally held in Burlington v. Dague30 that the lodestar
amount may not be multiplied to offset the contingent risk of nonpay-
ment in those cases where, by statute, the plaintiffs' attorney's fees
come directly from the defendant's pocket.31 The Court again consid-
ered a risk multiplier as duplicative of factors which should have al-
ready been internalized into the lodestar figure itself. In particular,
the Court saw the risk of loss as depending primarily on the difficulty
of the case, which is already reflected in either the hourly rate or the
number of hours spent on a case.32 The Court was afraid that a multi-
plier for a risk of nonrecovery would "provide attorneys with the same
incentive to bring relatively meritless claims as relatively meritorious
ones. '33 The Court saw risk multipliers as an unsuitable method for
25 See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 94 (1989) (adopting "the lodestar ap-
proach as the centerpiece of attorney's fee awards," without any multiplier); see also King
v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en band) (noting that Supreme Court has
been "steadily subsuming most other factors" into lodestar figure).
26 478 U.S. 546 (1986).
27 See id. at 547.
28 Id. at 564.
29 Despite hearing a reargument specifically about risk multipliers in Pennsylvania v.
Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711 (1987), the Court was not
able to reach consensus. Due to the lack of a majority opinion, the most important legacy
of Delaware Valley was Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, which agreed with the dis-
sent that Congress intended to allow for risk multipliers in computing the reasonable attor-
ney fees authorized by fee-shifting statutes. See id. at 731 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see
also id. at 735-42 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connors concurring opinion formu-
lated a market approach to risk multipliers, which simply meant that courts should com-
pute risk multipliers that are not case specific, but instead are determined for a class of
cases reflecting the particular market for that case. See id. at 733 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring); see also id. at 745-47 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
30 505 U.S. 557 (1992).
31 See id. at 565. Such fee-shifting cases differ from common fund cases in which the
plaintiff's attorney's fee comes from the plaintiff's recovery.
32 See id. at 562-63.
33 Id. at 563. This particular fear has not been borne out by an empirical survey of civil
rights practitioners in the 1990s. See Davies, supra note 4, at 250-51.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
subsidizing attorneys for cases they had lost,34 and commented that
risk multipliers "would make the setting of fees more complex and
arbitrary, hence more unpredictable, and hence more litigable. ''35
Although the Court has not precluded an upward adjustment in a case
of exceptional success,36 it has ruled out the risk of nonpayment as
qualifying for such rarity.
Despite this trend, in Gomez v. Gates,37 a district court permitted
a multiplier of 1.75 under California state civil rights law because
unattractive plaintiffs made the case undesirable, not because of the
low probability of success on the merits. 38 The case was a civil rights
action that alleged excessive force by police against armed robbers,
and the plaintiffs were admitted criminals.39 This decision runs con-
trary to the reasoning in Dague, which would assume the undesirabil-
ity of a plaintiff to be subsumed in the computation of the lodestar. If
the undesirability of the plaintiff correlates with the initial probability
of the plaintiff winning, however, then a higher lodestar with a multi-
plier of just one can effectively be equivalent to a nonadjusted lode-
star with a multiplier greater than one. Because the calculation of
attorney's fees in civil rights cases is still evolving in the courts, 40 the
options methodology introduced in the next two Parts may be helpful
in formulating a coherent system for this purpose.
34 See Dague, 505 U.S. at 565.
35 Id. at 566.
36 See Hensley v. Eckhart, 461 U.S. 424,435 (1983). Note, however, that the Court has
never specified what would make a case "exceptional."
37 804 F. Supp. 69 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
38 See id. at 78-79.
39 See id. at 71.
40 In its most recent consideration of attorney's fees pursuant to the Civil Rights Attor-
ney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, the same California district court noted that:
In its lodestar calculation, the Court starts from the premise that in determin-
ing a reasonable hourly rate the proper focus is not upon what an appropriate
or customary hourly rate should be for the particular lawyer who has done the
work, but rather upon the nature of the services rendered, and what a reason-
able commercial client would pay by the hour for those services if the client
were free to choose its own counsel.
Gillen v. Gates, 847 F. Supp. 1475, 1480 (C.D. Cal. 1994). It is unclear whether the Dague
reasoning extends beyond statutory fee-shifting cases to common fund cases. A recent
case suggesting this might be the case is Berg v. Gackenbach (In re Bolar), 800 F. Supp.
1091, 1095 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that limitations on multipliers in statutory fee-shifting
cases extend fully to cases in equity).
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II
AN OPTIONS TUTORIAL
A. Options in History and Life
Options have a long and interesting history. Over 2,400 years
ago, the philosopher Thales bought what might have been the first
recorded option in Western history.41 In responding to the perennial
challenge (which academics often hear) of "If you're so smart, then
why aren't you rich?" Thales applied his meteorological forecasting
ability to predict a bumper olive crop one season. He then placed a
series of deposits with olive press owners which provided him with
exclusive use of those presses to make olive oil. Thus, he cornered the
olive press market and became rich by charging monopoly prices on
the rental of the olive presses. 42
Three of the most illustrative and controversial examples of real
options are marriage, suicide, and legal reform. 43 After all,
"[m]arriage entails significant costs of courtship, and divorce has its
own monetary and emotional costs. Happiness or misery ithin the
marriage can be only imperfectly forecast in advance, and continues to
fluctuate stochastically even after the event. Therefore waiting for a
better match has an option value."44 Similarly, "[s]uicides project the
bleak present into an equally bleak future, ignoring uncertainty, and
thereby ignoring the option value of life. Then religious or social pro-
scriptions against suicide serve a useful function as measures to com-
pensate for this failure of rationality. ' 45 Finally, "[a]t all times, people
and politicians tend to believe that at last they have got it right; the
balance of opinion that has just been reached will prevail forever.
41 See Crawford & Sen, supra note 12, at 7-10 (describing oldest references to
derivatives).
42 This may have been an early instance of the type of monopolization that is illegal
under § 2 of the Sherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (prohibiting any -person who shall
monopolize... combine or conspire... to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations"). Another historical example of an op-
tions contract is from the book of Genesis, in which Jacob acquired the option to marry
Rachel by working for seven years in her father Labans fields. See Genesis 29: 18-21
(King James); see also William F. Sharpe, Investments 470 (3d ed. 1985) (describing bibli-
cal options). Unfortunately, Laban insisted that Jacob marry Leah because she was older
than Rachel. Jacob did marry Leak However, he also acquired a second option to marry
Rachel by working for another seven years in Laban's fields. This was perhaps the first
instance of a fraudulent option and certainly not the last example of how an option invest-
ment may involve unforeseen risks.
43 See Dixit & Pindyck, supra note 12, at 24-25 (noting costs and risk aspects of mar-
riage, suicide, and legal reform).
44 Id. at 24.
45 Id. at 24-25.
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Therefore they will ignore future uncertainty and option values, and
change the laws too frequently.
'46
Consider this hypothetical: Madonna is an entrepreneur who
owns a sole proprietorship in the business of making vegetarian ham
out of soybean meal. Madonna's profits depend on the price of her
major input: soybean meal. Due to the variability of the price of soy-
bean meal, Madonna buys a soybean meal call option, providing her
with the right to buy 5000 bushels of soybean meal at $10 per bushel
at the end of six months. Exercising this option would cost Madonna
$50,000. The amount Madonna pays for this option is known as the
option premium. Suppose Madonna's premium is $5,000. In six
months, if the market price of soybean meal exceeds $10 per bushel,
Madonna will exercise her option and purchase 5000 bushels of soy-
bean meal at $10 per bushel (below the market price). If the market
price of soybean meal in six months is less than $10 per bushel,
Madonna will simply let her option expire and will be out just $5,000
(her option premium).
B. Option Values of Lawsuits
The simple but powerful observation that any lawsuit consists of a
sequence of decisions underlies the option-pricing approach to the in-
centive to sue.47 This approach, which views litigation from a multi-
stage decision perspective, clearly underlies much of the recent schol-
46 Id. at 25.
47 See Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to Sue: An Option-Pricing Approach, 19 J.
Legal Stud. 173, 174 (1990) (introducing options approach to analyzing litigation invest-
ments). For other applications of options theories to legal rules and institutions, see also
Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Beyond, 106 Yale L.J. 703, 704 (1996) (citing recent articles deconstructing difference
between liability rules and property rules in terms of different prices of options); Lucian
Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 775
(same); William M. Landes, Sequential Versus Unitary Trials: An Economic Analysis, 22 J.
Legal Stud. 99, 100 (1993) (arguing that sequential trials may decrease expected cost of
litigation); Paul G. Mahoney, Contract Remedies and Options Pricing, 24 J. Legal Stud.
139, 143-44 (1995) (considering money damages for contract breach as an option); Freder-
ick C. Dunbar et al., Shareholder Litigation: Deterrent Value, Merits and Litigants' Op-
tions (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 95-07-a, 1995) (analyzing
shareholder class actions as options); Michael S. Knoll, Put-Call Parity and the Develop-
ment of the Modem Mortgage (USC Law Center Working Paper No. 94-12, 1994) (analyz-
ing mortgages as options); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Options Approach to Corporate
Reorganization (March 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the New York Univer-
sity Law Review) (applying options approach to the division of value in corporate reorgani-
zation); Jeff Stmad, Taxes and Renewable Resources: The Impact on Exploration and
Development 5-10 (July 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the New York Univer-
sity Law Review) (discussing impact of taxes on the options to drill for oil, to develop oil
wells, and to begin oil production).
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arly work applying options theory to lawsuits.48 An options theory of
litigation views a lawsuit like the soybean meal option considered
above. Suppose that Madonna sells her vegetarian ham business so
that she can attend law school and become a women's rights plaintiffs'
attorney. Assuming that Madonna is a profit-maximizing individual, a
simple decision rule will dictate which lawsuits she will accept. An
options theory of the incentives for plaintiffs' attorneys to accept law-
suits explicitly models the series of options to continue a lawsuit, all of
which must be exercised to avoid the defendant winning a default
judgment. The typical model of litigation focuses on the incentives for
the plaintiff to bring suit. However, as is the case with contingent fee
arrangements, 49 class action suits,5 0 and shareholder derivative suits,51
48 See C. Frederick Beckner, I & Steven C. Salop, Issue Sequencing, Summary Dispo-
sition, and Optimal Legal Procedure 8-25 (Apr. 18,1995) (unpublished manuscript) (devel-
oping model of sequential legal procedure and determining optimal standards of summary
disposition and optimal sequence of legal and factual issues which a court should analyze).
Further, Professor Cornell's analysis extended an earlier literature in which litigation deci-
sions were based solely on the present discounted value of costs and (expected) benefits.
See Cornell, supra note 47, at 173. See generally John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal
Conflicts, 2 J. Legal Stud. 279 (1973) (applying expected value approach to civil litigation);
William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L & Econ. 61 (1971) (ap-
plying expected value approach to criminal litigation); Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. Legal Stud. 399 (1973)
(applying expected value approach to civil and criminal litigation); Steven Shavell, Suit,
Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Alloca-
tion of Legal Costs, 11 J. Legal Stud. 55 (1982) (applying expected value approach to litiga-
tion under four legal systems). There have been several recent extensions of this literature.
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of
Threats to Sue, 25 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1996) (developing model of credibility and success of
threats to bring negative expected value suits); Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, On Divisibility and
Credibility. The Effects of the Distribution of Litigation Costs over Time on the Credibil-
ity of Threats to Sue (Harvard Law School, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and
Business Discussion Paper No. 190, 1996) (same); Dunbar et al., supra note 47, at 26-32
(applying options value perspective to plaintiffs' attorneys' approach to nuisance suits and
securities litigation); Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, Real Options and the Eco-
nomic Analysis of Litigation: A Preliminary Inquiry, 15,17 (John M. Olin Program in Law
and Economics Working Paper No. 131, 1996) (developing general real options theory of
litigation).
49 See James D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn E. Spier, Expertise and Contingent Fees: The
Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation, 9 J.L Econ. & Org. 349, 350
(1993) (discussing conflicts between incentives for clients and incentives for attorneys
under contingency fee arrangements).
50 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balanc-
ing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877, 83 (1987)
(discussing agency cost problem in large class actions); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, The Plaintiff Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. Chli. L Rev. 1, 41 (1991) (discussing
incentive conflicts between representative plaintiffs and plaintiffs' attorneys in class
actions).
51 See A- F. Conard, Winnowing Derivative Suits Through Attorney Fees, 47 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 269, 281-85 (1984) (discussing incentive conflicts in derivative suits).
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the incentives for plaintiffs and plaintiffs' attorneys can diverge under
a risk multiplier approach to fee awards.
Referring to our hypothetical, suppose that the risk multiplier for
women's rights cases is 2 and Madonna's lodestar (the opportunity
cost to file a women's rights suit and pursue it all the way to trial) is
$100,000. The traditional expected-value intuition underlying a plain-
tiffs' attorney's decision whether to accept a particular lawsuit is that
she gives up $100,000 by accepting this lawsuit, but has a probability
(p) of earning $200,000, where p denotes the initial probability that
the plaintiff will prevail at trial. Thus, under the traditional expected-
value approach to litigation, Madonna's Expected Wealth (EW) from
accepting a women's rights lawsuit is EW = $200,000p-$100,000. 52
The value of p where EW equals zero, p', is Madonna's cutoff or
threshold probability value for accepting a women's rights case. For
the hypothetical values above, Madonna will accept a women's rights
case when p equals at least 1/2, or 50%. Madonna's decision rule is
graphically depicted in Figure 1. A hypothetical distribution for p is
represented by the downward sloping curve, and Madonna's cutoff p"
value is represented by the vertical line through p = p*. Madonna will
accept a women's rights case with p values to the right of and includ-
ing p* because her expected wealth from accepting such a lawsuit is
nonnegative. Madonna will not accept a case with p values to the left
of p" because her expected fee award will not cover her opportunity
cost of pursuing such a case to trial.
Notice that if the value of the judgment that a women's rights
plaintiff can win at trial is positive and if the initial probability of her
prevailing is positive, then a women's rights plaintiff will always want
to initiate the lawsuit. This makes intuitive sense because the plaintiff
in fee-shifting public interest litigation does not have to pay attorney's
fees. Thus, the incentives of the public interest plaintiff and the public
interest plaintiffs attorney differ because the attorney bears the risk
of the plaintiff not winning at trial.
53
52 An alternative way to calculate her expected wealth is to realize that there is a
probability of p that she will receive net earnings of $100,000, and there is a complemen-
tary probability of (1-p) that she will not get paid, meaning that she will receive net earn-
ings of (-$100,000). Thus, her expected total wealth from undertaking this lawsuit is just
the probability-weighted sum of her possible earnings, which is $100,000p +
(1-p)(-$100,000). This expression simplifies to $200,000p-$100,000.
53 It might seem that a socially desirable policy would look to streamline the legal sys-
tem by discouraging lawsuits in which the plaintiff initially has a low probability of winning
at trial. However, a low initial probability of the plaintiff winning at trial does not neces-
sarily mean that the case is meritless. The plaintiff may uncover favorable information
through discovery, for example. Additionally, the socially optimal amount of public inter-
est litigation should take into account the effects of possible lawsuits on the incentives of
potential defendants to engage in activities that generate harm or injury. For a model of
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This traditional analysis, however, does not acknowledge the fact
that a lawsuit actually involves a series of call options. Recall
Madonna's soybean meal call option, where she had the right, but not
the obligation, to buy 5000 bushels of soybean meal at $10 per bushel.
Madonna would let her option expire if the price of soybean meal at
expiration is less than $10 per bushel. Now that Madonna is a plain-
tiffs' attorney, her client has a litigation option. As long as the case
survives the defense attorney's motions to dismiss, the plaintiff has the
right, but not the obligation, to pursue the case to trial. If the plaintiff
does not exercise this option to continue the case, then the defendant
wins a default judgment.
54
Although codes of professional responsibility and the norms of
legal ethics dictate that the plaintiff owns the litigation option s5 the
decision whether or not to exercise the litigation option more realisti-
these and other considerations in private litigation, see generally Steven Shavell, The Fun-
damental Divergence Between the Private and Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26
J. Legal. Stud. 575 (1997).
54 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(d).
55 See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.18(j) (1997) (stating that plaintiffs
attorney "shall not acquire proprietary interest in the cause of action except for a reason-
able contingent fee contract").
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cally belongs to the public interest plaintiff's attorney. 56 As one com-
mentator states:
[Miost lawyers regard themselves as entrepreneurs and largely act
accordingly. These lawyers regard what they are doing as earning a
living or better. If a step on behalf of a client causes a decrease in
the lawyer's income, this move predictably is regretted and, often,
the lawyer attempts to avoid or frustrate such an action. If a step in
litigation will increase income, then the average lawyer naturally is
under an inducement to take such action and altruistic constraints,
at best, will be in contention for the lawyer's loyalty but may not
prevail. Consequently, the only apparent restraint on the lawyer's
economic self-interest is client control over important moves in the
representation. It might be believed that clients can regularly pre-
vent their lawyers from taking steps that are not in the clients' inter-
ests but rather are dictated by lawyer self-interest in obtaining fees
under fee-shifting arrangements. Client control, however, probably
does not work effectively and, actually, is unlikely to occur in fee-
shifting situations.5
7
Furthermore, the plaintiff's attorney (almost always) has more
specialized legal knowledge, litigation experience, and effective con-
trol over case management than the plaintiff. As Professor Wolfram
states:
The sources of lawyer power in the relationship are many and com-
plex, but chiefly consist of information monopolies, better access to
levers of effective power such as judges and court officials, and skill
in negotiating with clients through threats, dire forecasts of prob-
able alternative outcomes, and similar psychological pressures.58
56 See Charles W. Wolfram, The Second Set of Players: Lawyers, Fee Shifting, and the
Limits of Professional Discipline, 47 Law & Contemp. Probs. 293, 296-97 (1984) ("Scholars
who study the legal profession have been reporting for some time that lawyers regularly
depart from the professional model of client control and make critical decisions on their
own in... civil representations.").
57 Id. at 295-96. The balance between attorney and plaintiff ownership of lawsuits is
further complicated by the method of payment:
Concern for reputation aside, if the attorney were paid either a fixed fee or an
hourly fee, then she would have little financial incentive to reveal to her client
that the case had a low expected return. Instead, she might lead the plaintiff
blindly into litigation regardless of the case's merit. When the attorney is paid
a contingent fee, however, then she will act in her clients' interest and pursue
only those cases with a sufficiently high expected return.
Dana & Spier, supra note 49, at 350.
58 Wolfram, supra note 56, at 297. In addition, plaintiffs' attorneys have the option to
withdraw from representing the plaintiff, although the exercise of this option requires court
approval. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-110 (1980); Model Rules
of Professional Conduct Rule 1.16 (1997). Withdrawal is "something that is granted in the
great majority of cases but that occasionally may be denied, especially if opposed by the
client, or else granted with an unwelcome public tongue-lashing. Moreover, the attorney
may want to avoid getting a reputation as someone who abandons clients in midcase."
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For example, a plaintiffs' attorney may be able to convince the plain-
tiff not to exercise the option to continue the suit by framing the
choice in a certain way.5 9 These well-known moral hazard problems
are exacerbated if the suit is a class action, as is often the case in pub-
lic interest litigation. However, reliance by plaintiffs on their attor-
ney's recommendations about whether to continue a suit may be
socially desirable. Naturally, litigation options are not free to plain-
tiffs' attorneys, who must research the cases, write briefs, appear in
court, and conduct discovery. A plaintiffs' attorney cares about the
marginal or incremental costs incurred at each stage in the litigation
process because these are the prices which she must pay to exercise
her options to continue the suit. Madonna would recommend drop-
ping the case at the first point in time at which future litigation costs
exceed Madonna's expected fee award.
To illustrate the option value in litigation within the simplest pos-
sible framework, suppose that lawsuits can be divided into two peri-
ods: discovery and trial. Prior to the first period, the plaintiff has filed
suit and initial motions, but has not yet engaged in any real discovery.
Legal fees up to then are small enough in comparison to the sizable
and irreversible amounts incurred by discovery that they can be as-
sumed for simplicity to be zero. Madonna's first decision is whether
to incur those discovery costs. Regardless of her choice, Madonna is
not locked into proceeding with a trial merely because she decided to
engage in discovery. In fact, discovery results in gathering informa-
tion and updating the probability that the plaintiff may win at trial.
For simplicity, assume that discovery completely resolved the uncer-
tainty over the actual merits of a case. Thus, after discovery, both
sides of a case will know that the probability of the plaintiff winning at
trial is either zero or one.
Next, Madonna has to make her second choice, namely whether
to incur the sizable and irreversible costs of trial, drop the case unilat-
Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. Legal Stud. 189, 212
(1987).
59 There are well-known "framing effects" that cognitive psychologists have discovered
in human decisionmaking. See, e.g., Beth E. Meyerowitz & Shelly Chaiken, The Effect of
Message Framing on Breast Self-Examination: Attitudes, Intentions, and Behavior, 52 J.
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 500,505-07 (1987) (finding in study of breast self-examinations
that pamphlets describing positive effects of self-examinations are ineffective, while pam-
phlets stressing negative effects of failing to undertake self-examinations lead to behavioral
change). For two recent applications of framing effects to the law, see generally Mark
Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. Legal Stud. 287 (1996)
(presenting experimental evidence of context dependence in legal judgments); Edward J.
McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury- Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards,
81 Va. L. Rev. 1341 (1995) (finding gain versus loss framing has large impact on size of
nonpecuniary damage awards).
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erally, or accept a bilaterally agreed upon settlement amount. The
option value of litigation can be quite large, and leads to different
values for the cutoff or threshold initial probability of the plaintiff
winning at trial than if litigation is evaluated only by the expected
value of the potential trial outcomes.
To be specific, suppose that total litigation costs of $100,000 can
be divided into two components: $50,000 of discovery costs and
$50,000 of trial costs. Recall that Madonna will only pursue a case to
trial if, after discovery, the probability of the plaintiff winning at trial
is revealed to be one. Thus, Madonna's Revised Expected Wealth
(REW) from an ex ante viewpoint for accepting a lawsuit with an ini-
tial probability of the plaintiff prevailing at trial of p is given by this
expression: REW = p($200,000 - $50,000) - $50,000 = p($150,000) -
$50,000. The options-based threshold cutoff for the initial probability
of the plaintiff winning, p**, is determined by solving for p upon setting
REW = 0. Thus, p** = $50,000/$150,000 = 1/3 = 33.3%. Recall that the
traditional cutoff was p* = 1/2, or 50%. Thus, the options-based cutoff
is lower than the traditional expected-value-based cutoff, and
Madonna is willing to accept more cases when the option value in
lawsuits is taken into account.
The option value of litigation can be further illustrated by consid-
ering a case where the probability of the plaintiff winning at trial is p =
2/5 = 40%. Madonna's traditional (that is, nonoption) Expected
Wealth, EW, from such a case is (2/5)($200,000-$100,000) + (3/5)
(-$100,000) = (2/5)($100,000) + (3/5)(-$100,000) = $40,000-$60,000 =
-$20,000 < 0. Madonna would not accept such a case. This is con-
firmed by her decision rule to accept only those cases with p = p" = 1/2
= 50%. Madonna's Revised (taking into account options value) Ex-
pected Wealth, REW, from such a case is (2/5)($200,000-$50,000) -
($50,000) = (2/5)($150,000) - ($50,000) = $60,000 - $50,000, or $10,000
> 0. Madonna would choose to accept such a case. This is confirmed
by her decision rule to accept only those cases with p = p*" = 1/3 =
33.3%. This example shows how an options-based perspective leads
Madonna to accept some cases (namely all those cases with a
probability of the plaintiff winning at trial between 33.3% and 50%)
which she would not have accepted if she used an expected-value per-
spective which ignored the option value of litigation.
III
AN OPTIONS APPROACH To RISK MULTIPLIERS
Existing analyses of risk multipliers often focus on comparing the
lodestar multiplier and the percentage-of-recovery methods of award-
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ing attorney's fees.60 These discussions implicitly view the plaintiffs'
attorney as making one irreversible decision: to accept the case and
proceed all the way to trial or to refuse the case. Litigation, however,
is not a once-and-for all decision, involving instead a series of sequen-
tial decisions.61 An options perspective on plaintiffs' attorney's incen-
tives also provides insights into what values risk multipliers should
have and how they vary with the initial probability of the plaintiff win-
ning, the costs of discovery, and the costs of trial. These results are
formally developed in the Appendix.
A. Options-Based Risk Multipliers
Recall that the traditional expected-value based risk multiplier is
simply the reciprocal of the initial probability of the plaintiffs prevail-
ing.62 Clearly, the traditional risk multiplier falls as p rises. In addi-
tion, there is a boundary condition on how large the multiplier, M%
can be, assuming that it is feasible to determine the social value, V, of
a case independent of the initial probability of the plaintiff winning. It
is only socially optimal to litigate those cases with value V if pV > L,
or V > L/p. Here, L is as defined in the Appendix, the opportunity
cost to a plaintiffs' attorney of accepting this case, in other words, the
lodestar figure. Thus, M* = lip < V/L is the boundary condition the
multiplier must satisfy. Intuitively, if the multiplier gets too large (M"
> V/L), then plaintiffs' attorneys will bring suits even though it is so-
daily undesirable to do so because the expected social value is less
than the cost of litigation (pV < L, or L/p > V). Notice that if J de-
notes the judgment which the plaintiff would win at trial, then J < V
60 See, e.g., Lynk, supra note 10, at 187 (contrasting percentage-of-recovery agreements
often made between plaintiffs and attorneys with lodestar formula ordinarily used by
courts in awarding attorney's fees); William J. Lynk, The Courts and the Market: An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Contingent Fees in Class-Action Litigation, 19 J. Legal Stud. 247,256-59
(1990) (summarizing calculation of federal class action fee awards).
61 See supra Part II.B (analyzing litigation as series of discrete stages).
62 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. A similar damage multiplier that offsets
the probability of nonenforcement has a long history. For various reasons why the damage
multiplier should not be simply the reciprocal of the probability of enforcement, see John
E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal
Standards, 70 Va. L. Rev. 965, 994-97 (1984) (arguing that strict relationship oversimplifies
calculation); Richard Craswell, Damage Multipliers in Market Relationships, 25 J. Legal
Stud. 463, 465-66, 468, 473 (1996) (arguing that other factors, such as risk aversion of de-
fendant, need to be considered); Richard Craswell & John E. Caffee, Deterrence and Un-
certain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 279, 292-97 (19S6) (showing that multiplier
may be inappropriate even when enforcement costs are fixed or absent); Richard Craswell,
When is a Willful Breach 'Willful'? General vs. Specific Deterrence in Contract Remedies
53-55 (May 11, 1996) (unpublished manuscript on file with New York University Law
Review).
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usually holds with public interest cases. Also, notice the plaintiff in
public interest cases has an incentive to bring all cases with pJ > 0.
In terms of Madonna's numerical example,63 if the average
probability of winning at trial for a class of lawsuits is p = 1/2, then the
traditional expected-value risk multiplier M* = 1/p = 2. An options-
based risk multiplier M** is calculated by setting Madonna's Revised
Expected Wealth (REW) equal to zero. Madonna's REW when the
risk multiplier is M** is given by this expression: REW =
p($100,OOOM'*-$50,000)-$50,000. Setting this expression equal to
zero results in M** = [p($50,000)+$50,000]/$100,000p. Thus, if the av-
erage probability for a class of lawsuits is p = 1/2, then an options-
based risk multiplier is expressed as follows: M*" = [(1/2) ($50,000) +
$50,000]/(1/2) ($100,000), or $75,000/$50,000 = 3/2 = 1.50.
In the Appendix, the result that M** > 1 in general as long as p < 1
is formally demonstrated. It makes intuitive sense that the options-
based risk multiplier exceeds one for lawsuits where the initial
probability of the plaintiff winning at trial is less than one; however,
for a lawsuit where the plaintiff is initially certain to win, there is no
need for a multiplier larger than one.
How does M** compare with MS? Intuitively, the options-based
risk multiplier falls because plaintiffs' attorneys only decide to spend
T when there is no risk of nonpayment, where T is the part of the
plaintiffs' attorney's litigation costs that would be incurred at trial. In
other words, the risk multiplier falls when the option value of discov-
ery is taken into account. Figure 2 depicts this result. In the Appen-
dix, the result that M** < M* is formally demonstrated. This makes
sense because in a two-stage options-based model, only the invest-
ment cost of discovery involves a risk of loss. The cost of trial is only
incurred upon learning that the probability of the plaintiff winning at
trial is one, so there is no risk of loss regarding trial costs which needs
to be offset.
As with the traditional approach to risk multipliers, there is a
boundary condition (which is derived in the Appendix) on how large
M** can become. Intuitively, if the multiplier gets too large, plaintiffs'
attorneys will file lawsuits even though it is socially undesirable to do
so because the expected social value is less than the expected cost of
litigation.
B. Option Values for Settling Lawsuits
The analysis derived in the Appendix and illustrated in Part II.B
concluded that plaintiffs' attorneys have a greater incentive to accept
63 See supra Part II.B.
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lawsuits than previously believed under an expected-value analysis.
The formal reason for this result is that the option to continue a law-
suit after discovery resolves uncertainty concerning that lawsuit at a
mere fraction of the cost of pursuing the lawsuit all the way to trial.64
The analysis thus far has ignored the possibility of settlement.65 This
Part discusses an options approach to settlement and concludes that
an options perspective increases or does not affect the settlement rate
from that of an expected-value perspective. This result may be a
cause for concern if settlement is undesirable.66
Although plaintiffs are statutorily entitled to recover attorney's
fees if they settle instead of win at trial,67 plaintiffs may waive these
fee awards during negotiation.68 Further, in Marek v. Chesny,69 the
64 See supra Part II.B.
65 For further analysis of economic approaches to settlement, see Andrew F. Daughety,
Settlement, in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (B. Bouckaert & G. DeGeest eds.,
forthcoming 1998) (surveying asymmetric information game-theoretic models of pretrial
settlement); Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement of Litigation: A Critical Retrospective, in Re-
forming the Civil Justice System 13, 14-19 (Larry Kramer ed., 1996) (reviewing law and
economics literature on settlement and litigation in general).
66 Two main arguments have been made against settlement. The first is based on con-
cerns that justice requires the process of a public triaL See Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation
with a Mugger The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial
System in Civil Cases, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1808, 1820 (1986) (arguing that "Americans cur-
rently settle many of their disputes for the wrong reasons"); Jules Coleman & Charles
Silver, Justice in Settlements, Soc. Phil. & Pol'y 102, 106-08 (1986) (arguing that settle-
ments are undesirable because they may strain justice in our society); Owen M. Fiss,
Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (arguing that settlement is -a highly
problematic technique for streamlining dockets"). The second set of arguments is based on
economic concerns over judicial precedents being public goods, see Richard A. Posner,
The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 10 (1985) (arguing that judicial precedents have
significant external benefits as public goods), and efficiency concerns about the under-
enforcement of laws, see Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 23 J. Legal Stud. 307, 323 (1994) (arguing that socially optimal system of
regulation must internalize process of enforcement itself); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel
L. Rubinfeld, The Deterrent Effects of Settlements and Trials, 8 Int'l Rev. L & Econ. 109,
110 (1988) (suggesting disparate effects of trials and settlements on deterrence). For a
discussion of both the justice based and economic critiques of settlement, see generally
Miller, supra note 65, at 21-25.
In addition, there are process concerns about settlement. See Frank Michelman,
Law's Republic, 97 Yale L.J. 1493 (1988) (arguing that settlement prevents civic engage-
ment and formation of community relationships); Judith Resnik et al., Individuals within
the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L Rev. 296, 320
(1996) (expressing concerns about preventing victims and accused from publicly telling
their respective stories); Eric Talley, Liability-Based Fee-Shifting Rules and Settlement
Mechanisms Under Incomplete Information, 71 Chi.-Kent L Rev. 461,498 (1995) (arguing
that "process" concerns make normative value of settlement questionable). All of these
concerns apply to civil rights litigation, and indeed may be more important for civil rights
than for private litigation.
67 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994).
68 See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717,742-43 (1986) (holding that -District Court did not
abuse its discretion in upholding a fee waiver"); Moore v. National Ass'n of Se,. Dealers,
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Supreme Court construed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6870 to
mean that a civil rights plaintiff who rejects a settlement offer exceed-
ing the amount later recovered at trial is not entitled to an award for
attorney's fees incurred after the date of rejection of that offer.
71
The implications of an options perspective on settlement depend
on whether the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney is in charge of the
settlement decision.72 As with trial decisions generaly,73 the discus-
sion here considers the situation in which the plaintiff's attorney is
actually in control of the decision to settle,74 even though legally and
ethically, the plaintiff's attorney "shall abide by a client's decision
whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter." 75 In fact, "stud-
ies indicate that many lawyers give little deference to clients on such
762 F.2d 1093, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (emphasizing voluntariness as prerequisite to fee
waivers); Cynthia M. Culton, Comment, Voluntary Fee Waivers During Simultaneous Ne-
gotiation of Merits and Attorney's Fees in Title VII Class Actions: Moore v. National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 7 U. Bridgeport L. Rev. 361, 370 (1986) (discussing
policies of and problems created by fee waiver opinion in Moore).
69 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
70 Fed. R. Civ. P. 68.
71 See Marek, 473 U.S. at 10-11; Jean R. Sternlight, The Supreme Court's Denial of
Reasonable Attorney's Fees to Prevailing Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 17 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc.
Change 535, 566-68 (1989-1990) (discussing Marek); see a!so David A. Anderson, Improv-
ing Settlement Devices: Rule 68 and Beyond, 23 J. Legal Stud. 225, 229 (1994) (analyzing
bargaining game under Rule 68); Tai-Yeong Chung, Settlement of Litigation Under Rule
68: An Economic Analysis, 25 J. Legal Stud. 261, 265, 279-80 (1996) (analyzing incentives
under Rule 68); Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J. Legal Stud. 93,
121-23 (1986) (discussing distributional and settlement effects of combining Rule 68 with
fee-shifting statutes); Kathryn E. Spier, Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting
Rules, 25 Rand J. Econ. 197, 200-02 (1994) (same).
72 The effects of fee-shifting and settlement rules on the attorney-client relationship are
well documented. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney:
The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and
Derivative Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669, 691, 717-19 (1986) (explaining how lodestar
formula precipitates collusion between defendants and plaintiffs' attorneys because it
decouples settlement figure and fee award); Grundfest & Huang, supra note 48, at 15, 17
(noting that settlement option can be decoupled into two separate options, an option based
on merits and another based on litigation costs). Attorney's fee awards based on the lode-
star figure mean that plaintiffs' attorneys share their clients' downside risk, but not their
potential for upside gain of recovery from trial. See Coffee, supra, at 717-18. This option
creates an incentive for plaintiffs' attorneys to accept settlements that plaintiffs would not
accept themselves. For an analysis of the effects on settlement of alternative fee arrange-
ments and allocations of settlement power between plaintiffs and plaintiffs' attorneys, see
Miller, supra note 58, at 204-15.
73 See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (discussing decision whether to go to
trial in situations where plaintiffs' attorneys control that decision de facto).
74 For an analysis of the situation in which the plaintiff is actually in control of the
decision to settle, see Grundfest & Huang, supra note 48, at 17 (developing general real
options model of litigation). Note that, in most cases, neither the plaintiff nor the plain-
tiff's attorney completely controls the settlement decision.
75 Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(a) (1997).
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critical matters as when to settle a case and how vigorously to contest
it."76 Plaintiffs' attorneys often have de facto control over the deci-
sion to settle, especially in shareholder derivative suits and class ac-
tions, where the named plaintiffs are mere figureheads." Even in
other types of lawsuits, plaintiffs' attorneys may effectively control the
settlement decision because of their greater legal knowledge, familiar-
ity with the lawsuit's progress, or time spent on the case. An example
of the attempt to give plaintiffs more control over the settlement deci-
sion is the rule in some jurisdictions that lawyers are not permitted to
discuss or negotiate the fee award as part of settlement negotiations in
lawsuits which involve a court-awarded fee.78 This rule, however, has
been rejected by some courts, 7 9 and the analysis below considers the
situation in which court-awarded fees are part of the settlement
negotiations.
This section considers the possibility of settlement using the sim-
ple numerical example of Part I.B, where the plaintiff's attorney has
control over the plaintiff's decision to settle and court-awarded fees
are part of the settlement negotiations. Filing a suit and surviving a
defendant's motion to dismiss80 allows a plaintiff to engage in discov-
ery. The process of discovery provides the plaintiffs attorney with an
opportunity to conduct research and develop a case further if it looks
promising (in terms of an expected judgment or a settlement), but to
recommend that the plaintiff not continue with the case if it does not
look promising. Assume that after discovery, there is common knowl-
edge of the probability of the plaintiff prevailing at trial. Even though
both sides know either that the probability of the plaintiff winning is
zero or one, this information may not be verifiable to a third party,
such as a court.
If both sides know after discovery that the probability of the
plaintiff winning is zero, the plaintiff's attorney does not have a credi-
ble threat to go to trial, and the settlement is zero. However, suppose
76 Wolfram, supra note 56, at 297.
77 Additionally, there is always the possibility of unethical plaintiffs' attorneys who fail
to inform plaintiffs of defendants' settlement offers. Such unscrupulous conduct is hard for
defendants' attorneys to detect because of the requirement that defendants' attorneys can
only communicate with the plaintiff via the plaintiffs' attorneys. See Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility DR 7-104 (1980); Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 42
(1997).
78 See Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1021 (3d Cir. 1977) (-Only after
court approval of the damage settlement should discussion and negotiation of appropriate
compensation for the attorneys begin.").
79 See, e.g., Folsom v. Butte County Ass'n of Gov'ts, 652 P.2d 437, 446 (Cal. 1982)
(rejecting bifurcation of fee and settlement discussions).
so See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Generally, modem liberal rules of pleading are designed
to allow the survival of a fairly broad class of claims.
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that after discovery, both sides know that the probability of the plain-
tiff winning is one. Then the plaintiff's attorney would receive a net
award of ML-L or (M-1)L after spending an additional T after dis-
covery.8' A defendant would have to offer a settlement including at
least (M-1)L-T in plaintiff's attorney's fees if the plaintiff's attorney is
in control of the settlement decision. By making that settlement offer,
the defendant would save J+Dt, where Dt is the defendant's cost of
trial and, as before, J is the monetary judgment which the plaintiff is
expected to win at trial. Thus, it is individually rational for a defen-
dant in common-fund litigation to make a settlement offer in attor-
ney's fees of at least (M-1)L-T if J+Dt > (M-1)L-T. Clearly, the
smaller M is, the more likely this is to hold. Because M** < M°, a
settlement offer is more likely when the risk multiplier is determined
after taking into account the option to continue the case after discov-
ery. In terms of the numerical example in Part II.B and above, the
condition with a traditional risk multiplier is J+D, > $50,000, while the
condition with an options-based risk multiplier is J+Dt > $0, which
clearly will always be met.
In fee-shifting cases, defendants save J+Dt+ML by settling, so
that it is rational for individual defendants in such cases to make a
settlement offer in attorney's fees of at least (M-1)L-T whenever
J+Dt+ML > (M-1)L-T, or if J+Dt > -L-T, which is always larger than
zero because L and T are larger than zero. While this might appear to
be surprising, the intuition underlying this result is that the attorney's
fee award of ML appears symmetrically as part of the mathematical
expressions for both the lower and upper bounds of the settlement
bargaining range between the defendant and the plaintiff's attorney.
The above analysis considered the settlement decision after dis-
covery when the plaintiff's attorney had control over that decision. To
consider that same decision before discovery requires a consideration
of discovery costs. It is often true that discovery costs are asymmetric
between plaintiff and defendant. When the plaintiff is an individual
and the defendant is a corporation, for example, the defendant's cost
of complying with the plaintiff's discovery requests for nonprivileged,
relevant documents can be quite substantial.82 There is clearly a po-
tential for abusing the discovery process as the plaintiff enjoys the
81 (M-1)L > 0 because M > 1 as long as the initial probability the plaintiff would prevail
was less than one.
82 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), the scope of discovery is quite broad and includes
information not admissible at trial, so long as the information requested "appears reason-
ably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Id.
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benefits of discovery while the defendant bears the discovery costs.83
Even if the discovery request generates benefits exceeding its costs,
two different parties receive the benefits and bear the costs of discov-
ery.84 Thus, even when the discovery request is socially desirable (in
the sense that its benefits exceed its costs), it provides a small plaintiff
with an advantage over a large defendant akin to a model of negative
expected-value suits.85 Although both sides can make discovery re-
quests, an individual plaintiff may not incur much cost in complying
with discovery requests because she lacks "truckloads" of documents.
On the other hand, a corporate defendant could bury a plaintiff under
an avalanche of documents.8 6 Regardless of the size of the discovery
costs, they must be taken into account by both sides' attorneys in their
litigation planning.
Internalizing these costs of discovery, the plaintiffs attorney real-
izes that after discovery she will be able to earn ML-T with an ex ante
probability of p by spending D on discovery. The defendant would
have to offer a settlement involving at least p(ML-T)-D in plaintiff's
attorney's fees. By making that settlement offer, the defendant would
save p(J+Dt)+Dd, where Dd is the defendant's cost of discovery. Thus,
it is rational for the individual defendant in common fund litigation to
make a settlement offer of at least p(ML-T)-D if p(J+Dt)+Dd >
p(ML-T)-D. As with prediscovery settlement offers, this is more
likely to hold the smaller M is, and, because M** < M, it is more likely
when the risk multiplier is determined after taking into account the
plaintiff's attorney's option to continue the case after discovery. In
terms of the numerical example above, the condition with a traditional
risk multiplier is p(J+Dt)+Dd > p($150,000)-$ 50,000, while the condi-
tion with an options-based risk multiplier is p(J+D,)+Dd >
p($100,000)-$ 5 0,000.
In fee-shifting cases, defendants expect to save p(J+D1)+Dd+pML
by settling, so that it is individually rational for defendants in such
cases to make a settlement offer in attorney's fees of at least
83 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(iii) limits discovery to requests whereby compliance does not
impose a burden that is likely to outweigh the benefits, while Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(3)
allows courts to impose appropriate sanctions for violations.
84 For an in-depth analysis of the discovery game, see generally Robert D. Cooter &
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, 23 . Legal Stud. 435, 438
(1994).
85 See D. Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A Model in Which Suits are Brought for Their Nui-
sance Value, 5 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 3, 4-6 (1985) (explaining nuisance suits where defen-
dant incurs substantial costs before plaintiff incurs any costs).
86 The cost of complying with discovery requests is an example of how the litigation
process can mirror the phenomenon known in the economics literature as raising rivals'
costs. See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:
Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 Yale W. 209, 230-31 (1986).
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p(ML-T)-D whenever p(J+Dt)+Dd+pML > p(ML-T)-D, or if
p(J+Dt)+Dd > -pT-D. This inequality is unaffected by the value of
the multiplier M and always holds because its left-hand side is always
positive, while its right-hand side is always negative. Thus, there will
be immediate settlement, which is not surprising given knowledge
about litigation costs and the initial probability of the plaintiff winning
at trial. Notice that if the two sides' beliefs and expectations about the
probability of the plaintiff winning at trial differ enough initially to
satisfy the above inequality, but coincide after discovery, then both
sides initially will engage in discovery instead of settling immediately.
After discovery, the prior analysis of settlement then applies.
In conclusion, the likelihood of settlement is either unaffected (in
fee-shifting cases) or greater (in common fund litigation) both before
and after discovery once the option value of discovery is recognized
than when that option value is ignored.
IV
PROPOSED AND POSSIBLE REFORMS
One of the principal findings of this Article, namely that an op-
tions perspective leads to a lower risk multiplier than the traditional
multiplier, suggests three considerations in reforming the current sys-
tem. First, calculating the precise risk multiplier, namely M*" =
(D+pT)/pL, requires detailed knowledge about the specifics of a class
of cases, namely discovery costs, trial costs, and the plaintiff's
probability of winning at trial. Courts may not be equipped to deter-
mine the values of these parameters.8 7 Second, the Supreme Court,
perhaps for ideological reasons and certainly for reasons of adminis-
trative simplicity, moved in the right direction when it chose a value of
only one for the risk multiplier, but it undoubtedly failed to choose an
options-based risk multiplier value. Third, any reform of the current
system must include the possibility of improving on a multiplier of one
while keeping the informational burdens on courts low. One option is
further empirical investigation to determine whether, in order to mini-
mize social costs of error, we should choose a multiplier of 1.3, 1.4, or
something else. Regardless of the number chosen, it should be a con-
stant for the courts, at least for particular specialties within federal
civil rights practice. The current diversity and complexity of federal
civil rights practice suggest that the Supreme Court should break from
its tradition of treating attorney's fees issues broadly, regardless of the
87 See Herbert M. Kritzer, Let's Make a Deal: Understanding the Negotiation Process
in Ordinary Litigation 58-59 (1991) (discussing empirical work documenting difficulty in
quantifying value of litigation claims).
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manifold varieties of federal civil rights practice.88 Another possibility
is to devise some rule of thumb or simple algorithm for courts or an
administrative agency to use in setting multipliers. The formula de-
rived in the Appendix of this Article could serve as an approximation
for a more realistic (but also more informationally demanding) risk
multiplier formula when there are more than two stages of litigation.
V
ECONoMIC IsSUES RELATED To PUBLIC INTEREST
RISK MULTIPLIERS
The options theory of civil rights risk multipliers extends the
traditional expected-value approach to civil rights multipliers by tak-
ing seriously the simple observation that litigation is not instantane-
ous, but instead occurs over time.89 As an extension of the traditional
law and economics approach to litigation, the options-based approach
to risk multipliers presented in this Article raises a host of other eco-
nomic issues. This Part of the Article surveys these related economic
issues, as they are important for deciding how to reform the law so
that the private enforcement of federal civil rights, especially nonpe-
cuniary rights, is a reality and not an illusory promise. In particular,
this Part will consider the validity and robustness of a set of assump-
tions that generally underlie economic analyses of risk multipliers.
In order to construct an appropriate calculation of risk multipli-
ers, one must first determine the purpose of attorney fee awards. In
Henry v. Webenneier,90 Judge Posner wrote that "the object of judicial
fee determination is to simulate the results that would obtain if the
lawyer were dealing with a paying client .... 91 This perspective sug-
gests an attempt on the part of the judiciary to mimic the market for
lawyers who are paid regardless of whether they prevail. The appar-
ent simplicity of this approach belies the many economic issues re-
lated to determining risk multipliers. For example, there is no
comparable market to use as a benchmark because hourly rate billing
is typically not contingent, while contingent fee arrangements typically
88 See Davies, supra note 4, at 263 (suggesting need for Congress and federal courts to
narrow their focus when considering reforms).
89 See id. at 261 ("Payment of an hourly rate following five to seven years of difficult
litigation, and then only if one prevails, is not the equivalent of an hourly rate paid monthly
regardless of the litigation outcome.").
90 738 F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 1984).
91 Id. at 195. Professor Silver agrees, stating that "[flees equal to those that lawyers
ordinarily receive from paying clients further the goal of enabling parties to secure counsel
sufficiently well." Charles Silver, Incoherence and Irrationality in the Law of Attorneys'
Fees, 12 Rev. Litig. 301, 310 (1993).
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calculate fees as a percentage of the dollar amount recovered as op-
posed to hourly rates.
The policies advanced by fee-shifting can be divided into three
categories: litigant incentives, equity, and externalities. 92 These same
three concerns arise regarding the hypothetical market outcome that
risk multipliers allegedly attempt to replicate. Professor Shavell has
identified six issues that address these categories of concerns, all of
which need to be internalized in a policy analysis of risk multiplier
value.93
First, the risk multiplier should be the reciprocal of the
probability of not losing a case, as opposed to the reciprocal of the
initial probability of winning a case at trial.94 The reciprocal figure
should thus take settlement into account by adding the probability of
settlement to the probability of winning a case.95 Because litigation
occurs in discrete stages and the probabilities of settlement or victory
at trial vary over the lifetime of a case, a multiplier can be computed
at each stage as the reciprocal of the probability at that stage of even-
tually winning or settling.96 Such a sequence of multipliers can be ap-
proximated in practice by a suitably weighted average of the initial
and final multipliers. 97 This Article applies the implications of the se-
quential nature of litigation to the valuation of risk multipliers and to
the incentives for plaintiffs' attorneys to accept cases.98
Second, market rates already implicitly embody some risk of non-
payment.99 A multiplier which ignored this fact would include a
double counting of the risk factor already subsumed in determining
the reasonable hourly rate.100 This moral hazard problem raises a
more general issue, namely that attorneys endogenously choose effort
levels. The traditional multiplier distorts that choice by directing
more time into low probability cases than otherwise would be true.
This effect is not necessarily socially undesirable because low
92 See generally Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A
Critical Overview, 1982 Duke L.J. 651, 652 (analyzing rationales for adopting fee shifting
system).
93 See Affidavit of Steven M. Shavell at 2-3, In re Burlington Northern, Inc., Employ-
ment Practices Litigation, Nos. MDL 374, 78 C 269, 1985 WL 1808 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 1985).
94 See id. at 6.
95 See id.
96 See id. at 9-12.
97 See id. at 11.
98 See supra Part IV.
99 See Affidavit of Shavell at 16-17, In re Burlington (Nos. MDL 374, 78 C 269).
100 See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1992) (relying heavily on this
argument).
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probability cases are not necessarily less meritorious ones. 10 1 Once
again we have to ask whether the objective is merely to replicate what
a nonexistent market would produce or whether we hope to en-
courage specific areas of civil rights litigation, even if that litigation
may not succeed. 10 2
Third, because attorneys are in effect fully insured, case-specific
traditional multipliers would lead attorneys to take on any case, re-
gardless of its merits.10 3 Thus, a case-by-case traditional multiplier
does not duplicate the outcome in a private litigation market, where
clients weigh the merits of each case against its expected litigation
costs.'
0 4
Fourth, there is the possibility of adverse selection.105 Because
lawyers probably differ in "quality" (meaning that the probability of
winning at trial is not really fixed) and risk attitudes, the use of a risk
multiplier may only attract those lawyers with less skill or lower de-
grees of risk aversion, while the absence of a risk multiplier may have
the opposite effect. 10 6 Further, recent Supreme Court decisions erod-
101 See supra Part I (outlining benefits of encouraging attorne)s to take high risk
cases).
102 There may be social benefits which exceed the private returns to individual litigants
in civil rights litigation. These public goods include the resolution of statutory ambiguity,
increased judicial experience, and the symbolic message that justice will prevail, which
might deter other future violations. See Kirchoff v. Flynn 786 F.2d 320, 327 (7th Cir. 1986)
("Much civil rights litigation is designed to obtain injunctions or precedents. These may be
exceptionally valuable but have no ready monetary equivalent."); see also James D. Kole,
Comment, Nonpayment Risk Multipliers: Incentives or Windfalls?, 53 U. Chi. L Rev.
1074, 1090 (1986) (arguing that fee arrangements can "give no indication of the appropri-
ate fee in cases with primarily injunctive or precedent-creating motivations, which cannot
be reduced to monetary terms" (citing Kirdtoff, 786 F.2d at 328)).
103 See Dague, 505 U.S. at 563 (noting this perverse incentive effect); Affidavit of
Shavell at 18, In re Burlington (Nos. MDL 374, 78 C 269).
104 One possibility is to compute traditional multipliers where the relevant probabilities
are not particular to a given case, but instead are relevant to a general class of cases. This
is the market approach to risk multipliers Justice O'Connor proposed in Pennsylvania v.
Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 731 (1937) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); see also Leubsdorf, supra note 15, at 501-10 (arguing for "across-the-board"
approach to risk multipliers). However, the question then becomes what the relevant set
of cases should be: 1) all cases; 2) that particular attorney's historical portfolio of cases; 3)
a broad category of cases (for example, civil rights cases); or 4) a more restricted classifica-
tion of cases (for example, cases involving employment discrimination). In addition, if the
multiplier is not based on the particular case in question, it will lead to overcompensation
for all of the inframarginal cases, which involve probabilities of the plaintiff wvinning that
exceed the threshold cutoff level.
105 See Affidavit of Shavell at 17-19, In re Burlington (Nos. MDL 374, 78 C 269).
106 It is unclear whether the objective is or should be to attract into civil rights litigation
lawyers of any quality, lawyers of quality comparable to those involved in other areas of
litigation, or only the "cream of the crop." See Charles Silver, Unloading the Lodestar:.
Toward a New Fee Award Procedure, 70 Tex. L Rev. 865, 931 (1992) (-The law will
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ing reasonable fee awards'0 7 have caused many attorneys to avoid civil
rights cases out of financial considerations.108 Such adverse selection
also lessens the quality of lawyers involved in civil rights litigation.
Fifth, there are equity issues related to traditional multipliers.
Under a risk multiplier regime, clearly liable defendants (cases with a
value of p close to one) pay less in fee awards than defendants in close
cases (those with a value of p close to 50%) who may not have
wronged a plaintiff.'0 9 While advocates of the risk multiplier note the
favorable equity effect on plaintiffs who otherwise would be unable to
afford legal representation, the right to a fee award is an asset that is
only valuable when used to hire lawyers. o10 As in other situations,
income taxes and the welfare system may provide a cheaper way for
society to achieve redistributional goals than legal rules chosen specif-
ically because they shift wealth from rich to poor."'
Sixth, using a risk multiplier to encourage civil rights litigation
assumes that civil rights lawyers are motivated by financial considera-
tions.112 However, civil fights attorneys often accept cases based on
nonfinancial considerations, such as feeling empathy with their clients,
seeking vindication of rights, and fighting for justice.113 Further, at-
continue to be a jumble unless and until the term 'competent counsel' is authoritatively
defined.").
107 See supra Part I (discussing Court's treatment of risk multiplier).
108 See Davies, supra note 4, at 228-29 (relating one attorney's belief that Dague will
have a "chilling effect on the practice of civil rights law" and will deter "'cutting edge'
cases and, thus, slow development of the law" (discussing City of Burlington v. Dague, 505
U.S. 557 (1992))); Sternlight, supra note 71, at 584 ("[F]rom the perspective of the plain-
tiffs' civil rights attorneys, the lodestar is both insufficient and unobtainable.").
109 See Affidavit of Shavell at 18-19, In re Burlington (Nos. MDL 374, 78 C 269). This is
because, for example, the multiplier for cases with a value of p=l/2 is two, while the multi-
plier for cases with a value of p=99/100 is only 100/99, which is barely more than one and
substantially less than two.
110 See Silver, supra note 106, at 874.
111 See Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal
Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71
Am. Econ. Rev. 414 (1981). The traditional law and economics approach indicates that
using taxes to redistribute income is less costly than using legal rules that shift wealth from
the rich to the poor. This is because the former only distorts work incentives, while the
latter also distorts the incentives to engage in activities which may lead to being sued.
112 See Davies, supra note 4, at 251 ("The plaintiffs' attorneys interviewed repeatedly
noted that their economic survival demands high selectivity and careful investigation
before undertaking representation of a client.").
113 See id. at 251-52 ("Employment lawyers, for example, volunteered the following
motivations: commitment to bringing about positive organizational change, a belief that
employment litigation is necessary to make organizations deal with the problems, and com-
mitment to help people without power who are hurt by those with power." (citations omit-
ted)). Davies also noted that "[a] prison conditions attorney said that despite small
salaries, the attorneys in her office stay because they are committed to the type of work
they do." Id. at 252 (citation omitted). For formal models of the implications of anger for
the incentives of litigation participants to sue, settle, or go to trial, see Peter H. Huang &
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torneys who choose public interest careers often do so to be able to
act according to nonfinancial principles, to have a career that makes a
difference, and to feel fulfilled by their work.
114
Despite these considerations, financial incentives remain a factor
for public interest attorneys. Though "[w]hat one hopes to get out of
working is not all money nor understandable in monetary terms," Pro-
fessor Radin notes, "[b]ecause this is a market society, most people
must be paid for their work if they are to live."'1 s Mimicking a mar-
ket for private interest litigation, however, requires only that financial
incentives matter to public interest attorneys, not that they dominate
or preclude nonfinancial considerations. Increasing an attorney's
lodestar fees through risk multipliers connects fee awards to a market,
namely that for the attorney's services. Thus, the very process of ap-
portioning plaintiffs' attorney's fees itself refers to an outside market
process. Given the scarcity of legal resources (a greater problem for
attorneys in civil rights practice than those in other areas of private
practice), attorneys must choose which cases to accept; even the most
devoted plaintiffs' attorney cannot accept every case. Encouraging
civil rights litigation through risk multipliers not only increases the
financial rewards but also legitimizes the psychological benefits of
public interest litigation.
CONCLUSION
This Article applies the simple but powerful observation that liti-
gation is a sequence of options to provide a more accurate description
of civil rights litigation than is assumed by traditional expected-value
approaches. An options perspective leads to a number of new insights
about plaintiffs' attorney's incentives in civil rights actions.
First, the threshold or cutoff value for the initial probability of the
plaintiff prevailing at trial that is used by plaintiffs' attorneys for ac-
cepting cases falls once the option value of discovery is taken into
account. Second, plaintiffs' attorneys will accept more suits under a
traditional risk multiplier approach to attorney's fee awards than cur-
rent nonoption approaches predict once the option value of discovery
Ho-Mou Wu, Emotional Responses in Litigation, 12 Int'l Rev. L & Econ. 31, 32 (1992)
(demonstrating that plaintiffs may sue more and settle less when emotions are motivating
factors).
114 See Davies, supra note 4, at 251-52. For formal models of effects of shame and guilt
on corruption and professional ethics, see generally Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More
Order Without More Law- A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures, 10 J.L
Econ. & Org. 390 (1994).
115 Margaret Jane Radin, Contested Commodities 104-05 (1996) (arguing that commodi-
fled and noncommodified exchanges pervade our market society and most individuals ex-
perience work as partially defining their identities).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
is taken into account. Third, the value of the risk multiplier is less
than when the option nature of litigation is not taken into account.
Fourth, in the general case, the value of the risk multiplier lies be-
tween the Supreme Court's current view of only one (that is, no multi-
plier) and the traditional view of the reciprocal of the initial
probability of the plaintiff winning (that is, a multiplier that is larger
than one). Fifth, an options-based risk multiplier rises as either the
initial probability of the plaintiff winning or the cost of trial (trial op-
tion strike price) falls and as the cost of discovery (trial option pre-
mium) rises. Sixth, if the plaintiffs' attorney controls the settlement
decision, then the likelihood of settlement in common-fund litigation
is greater before and after discovery than when the option value of
discovery is ignored. Seventh, if the plaintiffs' attorney controls the
settlement decision, the likelihood of settlement in fee-shifting cases is
unaffected before and after discovery by taking into account the op-
tion value of discovery because there will be an immediate settlement
assuming there is symmetric information between parties.
Finally, an options perspective also suggests numerous empiri-
cally testable hypotheses. These include the following propositions.
Holding all other factors constant, plaintiffs' attorneys will accept
more cases when discovery is less costly (lower trial option premium),
and will accept more cases when trial is more costly (higher trial op-
tion strike price). Further, if a significant amount of discovery is re-
quired for parties to learn a common value for the probability of the
plaintiff prevailing, then settlement will not occur until a substantial
amount of time and resources are spent on the discovery process. If
most civil rights lawsuits have a low probability of the plaintiff prevail-
ing, then we should observe settlements that correlate with expected
damages rather than with the probability of the plaintiffs prevailing.
Finally, if discovery reveals that most lawsuits are stronger than origi-
nally thought when they are filed, then settlements will typically be
higher the more time that had passed since the filing of the complaint.
The majority of this Article has focused on the details of the first
issue, namely that litigation involves sequential decisionmaking, while
taking into account plaintiffs' attorney's incentives and differing
probabilities of the plaintiff winning at trial. The remaining issues are
left for future inquiry.
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APPENDIX
The following variables are used to investigate the incentives for
plaintiffs' attorneys to accept civil rights cases:
1 6
p = initial probability that the plaintiff wins at trial in a particular
class of cases
L = opportunity cost to a plaintiffs' attorney of accepting a case,
namely, her lodestar figure
M = risk multiplier (M > 1)
EW = expected wealth to a plaintiffs' attorney from accepting a case
A. An Options Theory of Private Enforcement
By definition, the expected wealth to the plaintiffs' attorney from
accepting a certain case is computed by subtracting the opportunity
cost of accepting the case from the product of three quantities: the
probability of the plaintiff winning at trial, the risk multiplier, and the
lodestar figure. In symbols:
(1) EW = pML-L = (pM-1)L
For any given values of L and M, the cutoff threshold initial
probability for a suit to be undertaken by a plaintiffs' attorney is p =
1/M. This can also be determined by solving for p when setting EW =
0. However, the analysis thus far is incomplete because it fails to ac-
knowledge the fact that the plaintiff's lawsuit is an option.
For simplicity, assume there are only two stages to the litigation
process: discovery and trial. Then, the plaintiff's attorney's litigation
costs can also be broken up into two components, one for discovery
and one for trial: L = D + T. Any opportunity costs incurred before
discovery here are assumed to be zero. The plaintiff's attorney has
two decisions: first, whether to sink irreversible and significant re-
sources D into discovery, and second, whether to sink irreversible and
significant resources T into trial. Discovery provides an opportunity
for the plaintiffs attorney to gather more and possibly significant in-
formation about the case." 7
Suppose further that discovery resolves all of the uncertainty con-
cerning a case's merits. This means that the plaintiff's attorney will
116 Observe that the level of plaintiff's recovery does not appear in this analysis and may
even be nonmonetary in nature if the plaintiff is, for example, seeking injunctive relief
instead of damages.
117 As Professor Donohue pointed out, "attorneys do not have an opinion about the
probability of success of a client's case from the minute the client walks in the door. Re-
search, fact-finding, and lengthy discovery are all prerequisites to the formulation of an
opinion." John J. Donohue, IH, The Effects of Fee Shifting on the Settlement Rate: 'Theo-
retical Observations on Costs, Conflicts, and Contingency Fees, 54 Law & Contemp. Probs.
195, 217 (1991).
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know after discovery whether the probability of the plaintiff winning
is zero or one. Clearly, the plaintiffs attorney will go to trial only if
that posterior probability is one. The options-based intuition underly-
ing a plaintiff's attorney's decision to accept a particular case is that
she only gives up D by accepting the case due to the ability not to
exercise the option to continue a case which discovery reveals will not
prevail at trial. She has a probability p of earning ML as well as incur-
ring the additional cost of T to exercise the option to continue a case
that discovery reveals will prevail at trial. An alternative way to think
about this is that, with a probability of p, she earns net earnings of
(M-1)L, while with a complementary probability of (l-p) she does
not get paid and she receives net earnings of (-D). Her revised ex-
pected wealth from undertaking this case is just the probability-
weighted sum of her possible earnings, which simplifies to equation
(2) below.""
More formally, after expending D on discovery, the plaintiff's at-
torney's Revised Expected Wealth (from an ex ante viewpoint),
REW, is calculated by subtracting the discovery cost from the differ-
ence between two terms, the first being the product of these three
quantities: the initial probability of the plaintiff winning at trial, the
risk multiplier, and the lodestar figure, and the second being the prod-
uct of these two quantities: the initial probability of the plaintiff win-
ning at trial and the opportunity cost of trial. In symbols:
(2) REW = pML-pT-D
= p(M-1)T + ED, where "net" expected discovery costs
(3) ED = p[(M-1)D]+(1-p)(-D) = (pM-1)D
Notice that REW can be written as a function of EW:119
(4) REW = EW + (1-p)T
Equation (4) means that the value of the litigation option is
(1-p)T, which is positive because each of its components is positive.
In particular, this option value increases with the cost of trial. This
makes intuitive sense because when the litigation option to continue
the suit is not exercised, the benefit to the plaintiffs' attorney is not
incurring trial costs on a case that discovery has revealed will not pre-
vail at trial. As trial costs increase, more is saved by not exercising the
option to continue the suit. The litigation option value also decreases
with the initial probability that the plaintiff wins. Again, this result
makes intuitive sense because, ex ante, the option to continue the suit
118 Revised expected net wealth = p[(M-1)L]+(1-p)(-D) = pML-pL-D+pD = pML-
p(D+T)-D+pD = pML-pT-D.
119 REW = p(M-1)T+(pM-1)D = pMT-pT+pMD-D = pM(D+T)-pT-D = pML-pT-D-
T+T = pML-pT-L+T = pML-L-pT+T = EW+(1-p)T.
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is more likely to be exercised the higher the initial probability that the
plaintiff wins. Put another way, the ex ante likelihood that the option
to continue the suit after discovery is worthless decreases as the initial
probability that the plaintiff wins increases.
The new threshold cutoff for the initial probability of the plaintiff
winning, p, is determined by solving for p when setting REW = 0.120
Thus:121
(5) p* = DI(ML - T)
How does p** compare with p'? Intuitively, the cutoff probability
should fall when an options perspective is applied because plaintiffs'
attorneys can spend D, a fraction of total litigation costs to learn for
certain whether they will get paid. This fact means that when the op-
tion value of discovery is taken into account, a greater number of suits
will be accepted by plaintiffs' attorneys than when the flexibility pro-
vided by the option to continue the suit after discovery is not taken
into account. Analytically, p* > p'" because M > 1 and T > 0.122 In
words, the cutoff value for the initial probability of the plaintiff win-
ing at trial decreases once the option value of discovery is taken into
account.12
The next question is how p** changes as M rises, all other things
being equal. Intuitively, a higher risk multiplier increases the plain-
tiffs' attorney's expected wealth from accepting a case with any partic-
ular initial probability of the plaintiff winning at trial. This lowers the
required initial probability of the plaintiff winning at trial for a case to
be acceptable to plaintiffs' attorneys. Formally, the cutoff probability
falls as M rises.' 2 4 This conclusion indicates that higher risk multipli-
ers lower the threshold cutoff for the initial probability of the plaintiff
winning at trial, and thus lead to more suits being accepted by plain-
tiffs' attorneys. Of course, this might be socially desirable if there is
no independent method besides the probability of the plaintiff win-ning at trial to decide which cases are worth bringing, as this measure
may not adequately capture the social benefits of civil rights litigation.
120 Using an equivalent expression for REW, this means solving for p when p(M-1)L =
(1-p)D, or pD+p(M-1)L = D, or p[D+(M-l)L] = D, or p[D+(M-I)D+(M-1)TJ = D, or
p[MD+(M-1)T] = D, or p(MD+MT-T) = D, or p(ML-T) = D.
121 Notice that p'" > 0 because D > 0 and (IL-T) > 0, which is true because ML = MD +
MT > MT > T as M > I and D > 0. Also, notice that p" < 1 because D < ML-T, or
equivalently, D+T < ML = MD+MT = M(D+T) because M > 1. Thus, p" is a bona fide
probability that resides in the open interval (0, 1).
122 M > 1 means that M-1 > 0, and T > 0 means that (M-1)T > 0, or MT-T > 0, or
MD+MT-T > MD, or ML-T > MD, or 1/M > D/(ML-T), or p" > p-.
1M See supra Figure 1 for a depiction of this result.
124 This relationship holds because ap"*/M = -LDI(ML-T)2 < 0.
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A final pair of questions is, holding all other things equal, how p**
changes as D changes and how p** changes as T changes. Intuitively,
the lower the cost of discovery, the lower the premium of the option
to go to trial by engaging in discovery, and the higher the demand for
such an option. Intuitively, the higher the cost of trial, the higher the
strike price for the option to go to trial, and the less valuable is the
option to go to trial. Formally, all other things being equal, the
threshold cutoff value for the initial probability of the plaintiff winning
at trial falls as D falls' 25 and falls as T rises.' 26
B. Options Theory of Risk Multipliers
An options theory of plaintiffs' attorney's incentives solves for
the risk multiplier by setting the expression in equation (2) for REW
equal to zero. This results in pML-D-pT = 0, or pML = D+pT, or
(6) M* = (D+pT)/pL
An options theory of plaintiffs' attorney's incentives also provides
insights about what values risk multipliers should have and how those
values vary with the initial probability of the plaintiff winning, the
costs of discovery, and the costs of trial. Notice that M ** > 1 as long as
p < 1.127 Also, note that M** < M* because p < 1.128 This fact becomes
clearer by noting that M**L = (D+pT)/p = D/p + T = M*D+T. Thus,
the options-based risk multiplier, M**, can be viewed as applying the
traditional risk multiplier to just the cost of discovery and not to the
cost of trial.
Another way of comparing M* to M** is to note that the tradi-
tional expected-value risk multiplier of M* is a special case of the op-
tions-based risk multiplier of M** when litigation costs are front-ended
into discovery costs and trial is costless. That is to say, when L = D or
T = 0, M** = (D+pT)/pL becomes L/pL = 1/p = M*. Note that the
current Supreme Court position of no multiplier 129 (or, equivalently, a
multiplier N = 1) is also a special case of the options-based risk multi-
plier of M** when litigation costs are back-ended into trial costs and
discovery is costless. That is to say, when L = T or D = 0, M* =
(D+pT)/pL becomes pL/pL = 1 = N.
Furthermore, notice that, holding all other things equal, the op-
tions-based risk multiplier falls as the initial probability of the plaintiff
125 This relationship holds as ap"/DD = [(M-1)T+MD-DM]/[(M-1)T+MD] 2 = (M-1)T/
[(M-1)T+MD]' = > 0 as M > 1.
126 This relationship holds because ap"/aT=-(M-1)D/[(M-1)T+MD] 2 < 0 as M > 1.
127 M'" > 1 is equivalent to (D+pT) > pL = pD+pT, or D > pD, or 1 > p.
128 p < 1 means that (D+pT) < D+T, or (D+pT) < L, or (D+pT)/L < 1, or(D+pT)/pL < 1/
p, or M <M.
129 See supra notes 19-36 and accompanying text.
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winning at trial rises,' 30 and the options-based risk multiplier rises as
the cost of discovery rises.' 3 ' Finally, all other things being equal, the
options-based risk multiplier falls as the cost of trial rises.'
32
Assuming that it is feasible to determine the social value, V, of a
lawsuit independent of the initial probability of the plaintiff winning,
there is a boundary condition on how large M can be. It is only
socially optimal to litigate those cases with value V if pV > D+pT, or
V > (D+pT)/p. Thus, MC" = (D+pT)/pL < V/L is the boundary condi-
tion that the options-based risk multiplier must satisfy. Although the
boundary condition for M** is the same as that for M (specifically, the
value of the risk multiplier is less than V/L), the range of risk multi-
plier values that satisfy the boundary condition is larger for options-
based rather than traditional risk multipliers because M" < M. Fig-
ure 2 illustrates this for any set of values of V, L, M" and M" if M" <
V/L < M*.
FIGuRE 2
CIVIL RIGHTS RISK MULTIPLIERS
0 1 M** M*
Proposition 2 M** <M* where
M*: Expected Value Civil Rights Risk Multiplier = Uip
M**: Options Civil Rights Risk Multiplier = (D[+pTpL
130 This relationship holds because DMWap = [pLT-(D+pT)L](p 2L) = -DLI(pL) = -D/
Wp) < o
131 This relationship holds because aM"/D = [(pD+pT)-(D+pT)p]pL 2 = [pT-pT1pL =
(1-p)TIL 2 > 0 as p < 1.
132 This relationship holds because WMIT = [(pD+pT)p-(D+pT)p]/pL 2 = [p=D-pDlfpL
= (p-1)DIL2 < 0 as p < 1.
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